Liberalization and Competition in Postal Markets: Decentralized Infrastructure versus Cherry Picking by Maegli, Martin
11Network Industries Quarterly | vol. 12 | no 1  | 2010 
A R T I C L E
The postal sector is not entirely diff erent from other network industries, except for the lack of a physi-
cally installed infrastructure while postal networks are 
rather virtual. The postal network is very labor intensive 
and not subject to high investments or sunk costs. The 
operating costs are rather scalable variable costs, such as 
labor costs, or disposable assets, for example, vehicles or 
immovables (knieps 2007). Therefore the labor intensive 
sub-process of delivery represents approximately 55 per-
cent of the costs of mail conveyance (Nera 2004). Thus 
the postal monopoly is a contestable monopoly and was 
successfully attacked in partly liberalized postal markets 
notably Sweden, Finland, Germany, the UK and the 
Netherlands. Nevertheless, physical postal products are 
not only subject to competition by new entrants but also 
to potential substitutions through intermodal competi-
tion like electronic communication and media.
The universal service obligation in postal markets 
Universal service obligations usually require fi rms to pro-
vide certain services that they otherwise would not supply. 
In general the universal service is defi ned from an indi-
vidual consumer’s perspective: It is a service or product 
to which a consumer is entitled no matter where he/she 
lives; that is, in terms of access to the service, quality and 
aff ordability. Th e traditional defi nition of the universal 
service in the postal sector implies ubiquitous delivery at a 
uniform price at least for letter mail but in many cases also 
parcels. Because of the characteristics of their networks, 
providers of postal universal services can even be obliged 
to provide services that go beyond postal services. Th ese 
can include public missions like the nationwide delivery 
of daily newspapers before a specifi c hour or to provide 
fi nancial services. Especially customers in non-densely 
populated and non-central areas are less attractive from a 
supplier’s point of view, and less likely to receive attractive 
competing off ers. Second, they are also the most vulner-
able to price increases. Th erefore, the provision of univer-
sal services and its fi nancing in the future with respect to 
public interests are related to two important issues: Th e 
provision of postal services to all customers / citizens and 
to provide the universal services at aff ordable prices
Th e universal service was originally fi nanced by the 
reserved area. But, markets are nowadays expected to be 
more and more liberalized and to avoid monopolistic 
market structures. Under a reserved area the rural areas 
are cross subsidized by urban areas. Furthermore, in con-
trast to other network industries the receivers do not pay 
for the services they consume. Mail to rural areas is not 
only subsidized by urban areas, but also by large business 
customers with high volumes. Th ese volumes are mostly 
pre-sorted and centrally collected. As a result the uniform 
prices of postal items for private customers do not neces-
sarily refl ect the actual cost of delivery. Price Waterhouse 
Coopers (2006) states that this is the source of ‘obligation’ 
in the discussion about universal services which leads to 
a number of problems. In liberalized markets this type of 
cross-subsidization as a general way of funding universal 
services is no longer feasible. Because there is no reserved 
area and bulk-mail is excluded from universal services. Th e 
customers who have large volumes of mail sent to low-cost 
areas will be most attractive to entrants. New competi-
tors that are not expected to provide full universal services 
would penetrate on the more profi table segments in which 
incumbents still off er higher prices to cross-subsidize the 
non-profi table segments which they are obliged to serve. 
At worst, the funding of universal services is no longer 
guaranteed. Th erefore the operators that fulfi ll the obliga-
tion must at least be compensated for the cost of the uni-
versal service otherwise they might be economically forced 
to set higher uniform tariff s to compensate market share 
losses in rural areas. Hence the centralized ex-ante regula-
tion of postal universal services and the monitoring of its 
development is a means to ensure the provision to all cus-
tomers at aff ordable prices—no matter which fi nancing 
mechanism is chosen and how competition evolves (Oxera 
2006). 
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Market entry strategies and competition 
Dietl and Waller (2002) identify several potential business 
models for new entrants: local mail services, networked 
local mail services, document exchange, mass mail pro-
vider, spot operator, consolidator, the provision and the 
national full service provider. Additionally, de Bas and 
van der Lijn describe the niche provider as a further entry 
model. Market entrants can be former customers of post-
al operators, for example like publishers or letter shops, 
existing local networks for unaddressed mail, incumbent 
postal operators from abroad or completely new players. 
Next, we describe diff erent market entry strategies and the 
development of competition in fully or partly liberalized 
European postal markets (Ecorys 2008)
Th e Swedish postal market has been fully liberalized 
since 1993. In the following, the legislation rather focused 
on the provision of the universal service and quality mat-
ters than on the introduction of competition. Sweden 
consequently changed the ‘paradigm’ and became more 
supportive of competition in the postal sector in the 
late nineties. Th e competition emerged very slowly and 
there is only one established competitor in the Swedish 
postal market. Th e company which today is called Bring 
Citymail, and owned by the Norwegian Post, was founded 
in 1991 as Citymail. Th e entire business model concen-
trated on industrial pre-sorted sendings and bulk mail 
in Sweden’s largest cities—like Stockholm, Malmö and 
Gotheburg—and its suburban areas. With this model 
Citymail covered approximately 40 percent of the Swedish 
area in 2008. Th e delivery staff  is paid by delivered item. 
Citymail’s business model is rather centralized. It strongly 
focuses on cities and excludes daily delivery. Investments 
through the option lens
Th e Dutch postal market has been fully liberalized 
since the spring of 2009. Th e competition has seen a 
strong increase in recent years. It intensifi ed due to the 
market entrance of the two carriers Sandd and Selekt Mail 
after 2000; Selekt Mail being a joint venture of Deutsche 
Post DHL and the publishing group Wegener. Th e two 
entrants built their business model in a promising niche: 
in the market for low cost and low speed mail mainly tar-
geted to B2B (Business to business) and B2C (business to 
customer) markets. Th e original business model focused 
on a delivery frequency of two times per week. It relied on 
pre-sorted volumes of the customers and the use of fl exible 
labor force. Th e mailmen are predominately freelancers 
without a labor contract and paid per delivered item or 
address. In the end of 2007 the network of deliverers con-
sisted predominately of housewives (37 percent), students 
(22 percent) and retired people (11 percent). An interest-
ing fi nding is that at least three percent of the deliverers 
also work for other delivery services. Main clients are large 
mailers, as for example fi nancial service providers, telecom 
operators, publishers, charity organizations etc., . In the 
beginning both operators operated a hybrid model of de-
livery. During the development phase the built up their 
own networks and cooperated with a number of small lo-
cal mail service providers. Sandd reached a full coverage 
of the Dutch area in 2006. Th e cumulated market shares 
of the two carriers have risen from 0.03 percent in 2000 
up to 13 percent in the addressed mail segment and a 25 
percent share in the liberalized segment in 2008.
Th e development of the competition and the dupli-
cation of postal networks at the same time is partly re-
lated to TNT’s access policy. Since TNT was not off ering 
attractive conditions to the existing postal network, the 
main competitors set up their own nationwide networks. 
An important issue concerning the completion and the 
emergence of three rather decentralized postal networks 
are the geographical characteristics of the Netherlands: a 
high population density in line with a high degree of ur-
banization. Th erefore the competitors do challenge cherry 
picking. Instead of attacking large volume customers and 
deliver just in urban areas, they provide nationwide ser-
vices for those large clients. Furthermore, the possibility to 
use part-time freelancers in combination with low-speed 
mail and new sorting techniques enabled them to compete 
against TNT on pricing as well as product diff erentiation. 
TNT reacted with similar low cost respectively low speed 
mail services.
Th e Swiss postal market is only partly liberalized 
and there is a reserved area for letters up to 50 grams. 
Nevertheless, a fi rst competitor named Quickmail en-
tered the letter market targeting specifi cally addressed 
mail heavier than 50 grams, catalogues and customer 
magazines. Business customers hand in their mail items on 
Mondays and Tuesdays, the volumes are sorted in a single 
sorting center in the east of Switzerland on Tuesday and 
Wednesday. Th e delivery is carried out on Th ursday and 
Friday. In January 2010 Quickmail covered 6.3 percent of 
Swiss households. Quickmail plans to expand its network 
up to thirty percent of households by the end of 2010 and 
up to eighty fi ve percent by the end of 2011. In the early 
entrance phases Quickmail centralizes its operations and 
delivers in three cantons only. 
Th e concessioned area—where no free market was ap-
plied—in Germany has been gradually reduced and full 
market opening was realized in 2008. Th e dominant oper-
ator Deutsche Post is obliged to provide access to its postal 
infrastructure. One of the largest competitors of Deutsche 
Post is the Dutch incumbent TNT. In 2000, TNT and 
the Hermes Logistik group founded EP Europost which 
was lately renamed in TNT Post AG. Th e strategy was to 
proceed ten percent of addressed mail in Germany by con-
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centrating on B2C and B2B mail volumes. Th e interest-
ing point in TNT’s entry model is that the company pre-
dominantly provides centralized services like sorting and 
transportation as well as support functions while two third 
of the collection and the delivery is manly delegated to 
diff erent local and regional postal operators. By means of 
the cooperation with their partner networks TNT covers 
90 percent of German households without operating its 
own nationwide delivery network. TNT’s business model 
in Germany is a mix of centralized and decentralized ele-
ments in a sense that TNT has its own delivery networks 
only in rural areas. Furthermore TNT provides the central 
process step sorting before handing over to their partners 
which provide decentralized parts of postal services. 
Conclusions
An important regulatory issue concerning the develop-
ment of end-to-end competition is the chosen access re-
gime to the existing infrastructure. Th e possibility to have 
access to the established postal network facilitates market 
entrance for potential new competitors. From an incum-
bent’s perspective negotiated access could bring advantages 
as well as drawbacks: individual parts of the infrastructure 
or processes could be better challenged but it could also 
result in higher likelihood of cherry picking by entrants.
Th e examples given above show that new entrants 
chose centralized entry models to enter postal markets. 
Although the new entrants chose diff erent strategies and 
business models to compete against incumbents, they were 
similar in that they all diff er from the model of the origi-
nal national postal operator. Th ey either chose a special 
type of customer, a single area, densely populated region 
or a combination of these three conditions. Hardly a single 
competitor entered the postal market with full or nation-
wide coverage, resulting in the fact that the size of their 
own operated networks is substantially smaller than the 
network of the incumbents.
As mentioned above, new entrants in postal markets 
usually set up their delivery network by concentrating on 
the delivery in cities and urban areas and/or business cus-
tomers with large sending volumes. Th is implies that they 
operate their networks highly centralized—at least in the 
early phases of entry into the market.
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